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Abstract
Growing controversy surrounds the impact of labor unions on law enforcement behavior. Critics
argue that unions impede organizational reform and insulate officers from discipline for
misconduct. Yet collective bargaining tends to increase wages, which could improve officer
behavior. We provide quasi-experimental empirical evidence on the effects of collective
bargaining rights on violent incidents of misconduct. Our empirical strategy exploits a 2003
Florida Supreme Court decision (Williams), which conferred collective bargaining rights on
sheriffs’ deputies, resulting in a substantial increase in unionization among these officers. Using a
Florida state administrative database of “moral character” violations reported by local agencies
between 1996 and 2015, we implement a difference-in-difference approach in which police
departments (which were unaffected by Williams) serve as a control group for sheriffs’ offices.
Our estimates imply that collective bargaining rights led to a substantial increase in violent
incidents of misconduct among sheriffs’ offices, relative to police departments. The effect of
collective bargaining rights is concentrated among sheriffs’ offices that subsequently adopted
collective bargaining agreements, and the adoption of these agreements is associated with
increases in violent misconduct. There is also some evidence consistent with a “bargaining in the
shadow” effect among sheriffs’ offices that did not unionize.
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1) Introduction
Police unions sometimes successfully resist the imposition of discipline on officers for
misconduct. Huq and McAdams (2016), Keenan and Walker (2005), and Rushin (2017) show that
many law enforcement collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) create procedural rights for
officers that make it difficult for agencies to investigate and discipline misconduct, including the
excessive use of force.1 These scholars express concern that such contractual provisions undermine
the ability of management to deter misconduct and thus may promote its commission. Unions may
also successfully lobby for state and local legislation that provides the same kind of procedural
protections against investigation and discipline, or lobby and litigate against reform efforts. At the
same time, unionization might reduce misconduct by producing a sense of empowerment and
increased job satisfaction.2 Collective bargaining tends to improve wages and benefits;3 Becker
and Stigler (1974) argue that higher compensation can deter malfeasance among law enforcers by
raising its opportunity cost. Likewise, the theory of efficiency wages holds that paying wages
above the market-clearing equilibrium may improve productivity, which, in the context of police,
could entail decreased misconduct.4 Thus, the impact of collective bargaining on law enforcement
misconduct is ultimately an empirical question.
Numerous recent studies examine the issue of law enforcement violence (Fryer 2018;
Legewie and Fagan 2016; Shjarback 2015; Shane, Lawton, and Swenson 2017; Stickle 2016),
some focusing on the role of collective bargaining (Huq and McAdams 2016; Rushin 2017). Most
pertinent to our study, many scholars, drawing upon case studies, argue that unions impede
progressive policy reform and innovation (Bies 2017; Epp 2009; Fisk and Richardson 2016;
1

For instance, using Chicago data, Iris (1998) finds that disciplinary orders are frequently overturned during arbitral
review.
2
Unionization may also foster collective solidarity among police and interact with the intrinsic motivation of those
who self-select into policing. Dharmapala, Garoupa, and McAdams (2016) develop a theoretical model of selfselection and intrinsic motivation among law enforcement agents but do not address the impact of unionization.
3
Indeed, most prior studies on the effects of collective bargaining by law enforcement officers examine the
relationship between the bargaining environment and officer remuneration. Unionization is consistently and positively
associated with officer wages and benefits (Briggs et al. 2008; Delaney and Feuille 1985; Doerner and Doerner 2010;
Feuille and Delaney 1986; Feuille, Hendricks, and Delaney 1983; Freeman and Valletta 1988; Trejo 1991; Wilson et
al. 2006; Zhao and Lovrich 1997).
4
There is also some evidence that police performance is affected by changes in wages relative to a reference point.
Mas (2006) finds that police performance in New Jersey, measured primarily by arrest rates, declines when unions
lose in wage arbitration. Mas (2006) does not analyze police misconduct, however. Chandrasekher (2017) examines
police misconduct using data from the unionized New York Police Department. She focuses not on the impact of
unionization per se, but on the impact of lengthy negotiations that result in the expiration of union contracts (after
which officers are “out of contract,” with the terms of the expired contract continuing to apply in the interim). She
finds evidence that incidents of misconduct increase with time spent out of contract.

1
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McCormick 2015; Walker 2008).5 No previous work, however, has offered empirical evidence of
the causal role that collective bargaining rights play in the behavior of law enforcement.
This paper offers such evidence by exploiting a January 2003 change in Florida labor law.
By a judicial decision that month (Williams), county sheriffs’ deputies won the right to organize
for collective bargaining. Williams led to substantial unionization among sheriffs’ offices (SOs).
Officers at municipal police departments (PDs), in contrast, had the right to bargain collectively
both before and after that date. It is important to note that Williams is a source of exogenous
variation in collective bargaining rights, rather than in unionization per se, as SOs’ post-Williams
decisions to adopt CBAs are potentially endogenous with respect to factors that may affect
misconduct. Thus, Williams represents a “treatment” that involves collective bargaining rights,
regardless whether those rights are exercised. This interpretation highlights the possibility of
officers at agencies without CBAs bargaining “in the shadow of” collective bargaining rights. Our
focus on collective bargaining rights is motivated in part by findings in labor economics that strong
labor laws are associated with higher wages even for nonunionized workers (e.g. Freeman and
Valletta 1988; Ichniowski, Freeman, and Lauer, 1989).6
We examine how Williams affected incidents of misconduct by law enforcement personnel
at these two types of agencies. The empirical strategy involves the use of a difference-in-difference
framework, in which the treatment group consists of SOs, which were affected by Williams, and
the control group consists of PDs, which were unaffected. As discussed more fully in Section 4,
officers at agencies in the treatment and control groups perform similar job functions and are drawn
from similar pools of applicants. The treatment and control groups also experienced similar trends
in misconduct prior to Williams.
Our analysis uses a comprehensive administrative dataset on Florida law enforcement
agencies – covering both SOs and PDs – over the period 1996-2015 that is balanced with respect
to the primary variables. Our dataset combines annual Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP)

5

The small empirical literature on this question is mixed, however. Some studies find that unionization is negatively
associated with the adoption of particular reforms (Nowacki and Willits 2016) or modern accountability mechanisms
more generally (Epp 2009). Perhaps related, Magenau and Hunt (1996) find that unionized agencies place significantly
more emphasis on their “law enforcement” function relative to order maintenance or service delivery. Other work
finds no relationship (Wilson and Buckler 2010) or even a positive association between unionization and particular
reforms (Morabito 2014).
6
An alternative interpretation of our empirical design regards CBAs as the treatment of interest and Williams as
analogous to an “intent-to-treat” intervention. This is not our preferred interpretation, however, for the reasons
discussed in the text.

2
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surveys conducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) with administrative
data from the FDLE on incidents of misconduct and disciplinary actions against officers, known
as the Automated Training Management System (ATMS). The ATMS database records allegations
of officer misconduct, most of which have been sustained by local agencies before reaching the
FDLE. These allegations typically begin as civilian or internal affairs complaints investigated by
a local agency. If the local agency sustains the allegation (using a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard) and the offense violates a “good moral character” requirement, the agency is required to
report its findings to the FDLE, which opens its own “complaint” file and begins an independent
disciplinary process. These state-level investigations form the basis for the misconduct data in the
ATMS database.
“Moral character” violations are defined by regulation to include the commission of any
Florida felony or any of a substantial list of Florida misdemeanors, whether prosecuted or not, or
excessive force or misuse of official position as defined by state statute (F.A.C. Rule 11B27.0011). Within the universe of moral character violations, we focus on the subset involving
express or implied violence. Public concern is strongest regarding these highly salient incidents.
They are also most distinctively characteristic of law enforcement activity and arguably less
susceptible to changes in reporting behavior that might accompany unionization.
Because the typical complaint in our dataset has been sustained at least once, we refer to
this set of moral character violations as “violent incidents” rather than “complaints” or
“allegations.”7 The processes generating the ATMS data are quite complex, however, as detailed
in Section 3. For instance, a minority of complaints in the ATMS data originate from media
sources, civilian allegations made directly to the FDLE, and other (unspecified) sources, rather
than from allegations sustained by local agencies. In some instances, too, the FDLE does not
sustain a complaint, possibly due to the higher “clear and convincing” evidence standard it applies.
To account for these cases, we construct alternative measures of violent incidents, excluding
potentially unverified complaints, which generate results very similar to the baseline results
discussed below.

7

There is a literature that studies civilian complaints per se, as opposed to the incidents predominantly involving
sustained complaints that we study. Rozema and Schanzenbach (2019) find a strong relationship between civilian
complaints against police officers and misconduct as proxied by litigation, using data from the Chicago Police
Department.

3
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We employ a Poisson maximum-likelihood model for count data and control for agency
and year fixed effects and an extensive set of local and agency characteristics. We find that violent
incidents rose substantially among the SOs treated by Williams (relative to the control group of
PDs) in the years after Williams. Our estimates imply that the right to bargain collectively led to
about a 40% increase in violent incidents at SOs, which appears to persist over time. While this
effect may seem strikingly large, the baseline rate of violent incidents is low. The estimated effect
implies an increase of 0.2 violent incidents per agency-year, relative to a pre-Williams mean among
SOs of about 0.5. At a typical SO with 210 officers, this effect corresponds to one officer being
involved in one additional violent incident every five years. So described, the estimated effect is
not implausibly large, though it points nonetheless to a substantial divergence between SOs and
PDs following Williams.
The basic result is robust to a wide variety of tests reported or summarized in Section 4.4.
These fall into several distinct categories. First, we address the possibility of measurement error
in our violent incidents variable by constructing alternative measures consisting only of violent
incidents that have been more thoroughly verified by the FDLE’s investigative process. We find
very similar results. We also omit data for 2006, which saw an unusually large number of violent
incidents, and exclude violent incidents involving domestic violence, which, while serious, may
disproportionately concern off-duty behavior. Again, our results are robust.
Second, we implement a number of tests of the parallel trends assumption underlying our
difference-in-difference approach. Plotting the mean residuals of our violent incidents measure
(from a regression that controls for agency and year fixed effects and the number of officers)
reveals closely parallel trends for SOs and PDs prior to Williams. The result is also robust to
allowing for differential linear trends among SOs and PDs. Adding leads of the variable of interest
does not reveal any differential effects for SOs and PDs in years prior to Williams. Placebo tests
for years other than 2003 yield small and insignificant effects. Overall, the basic result does not
seem attributable to differential prior trends in violent incidents at SOs and PDs.
Third, we find little evidence for compositional effects on the number or characteristics of
officers following Williams. We also test for the possibility that violence-prone officers may have
moved from unionized PDs to unionized SOs following Williams and find that this is unlikely to
explain our central finding. (We note, too, that any compositional effects of this sort would imply
that violence-prone officers prefer to avoid non-unionized workplaces, which would itself be an
4

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3095217

interesting finding consistent with the tenor of our results). The basic results are also virtually
identical when using a balanced panel, so changes in the composition of the treatment and control
groups do not affect the results.
Finally, we test several alternative model specifications. Our preferred specification is a
Poisson model because of the highly skewed nature of the data and the large fraction of zero-value
observations. While the baseline specification models the number of violent incidents, modeling
the rate of violent incidents instead leads to very similar results. Moreover, a linear fixed effects
model of the violent incident rate per hundred officers yields fairly similar results that are
comparable in magnitude, as do log-linear models of the number and rate of violent incidents.
The estimated effect appears to be more concentrated among SOs that adopted CBAs
following Williams. The effect for these agencies is large and statistically significant at the 5%
level. For SOs that did not adopt CBAs following Williams, the point estimate is smaller in
magnitude and of only borderline statistical significance. Taken together, the results provide some
reassurance that the mechanism driving the baseline result involves collective bargaining, as
opposed to some extraneous factor that differentially affected SOs after 2003. Yet they also suggest
the possibility that SOs that did not adopt CBAs nevertheless bargain in the shadow of their
newfound collective bargaining rights.
This latter point, in turn, casts doubt on a potential alternative explanation for our finding:
that unionization may increase “bureaucratization.” This explanation would posit that management
in a unionized agency is more likely to formalize complaints, and so the increase in violent
incidents we detect may actually reflect changes in reporting behavior rather than officer behavior
on the street. Yet this formalization effect is unlikely to apply within SOs that did not unionize.
That these agencies also experience a positive (albeit weaker) effect on violent misconduct
therefore undermines the bureaucratization explanation. Unfortunately, it is difficult to distinguish
statistically between this “shadow” effect and the effect of CBAs. This may be because virtually
all CBAs among SOs were adopted in the immediate aftermath of Williams (during 2003-2006)
and so were closely contemporaneous with Williams’ impact on collective bargaining rights. Thus,
the precise delineation of the relative magnitudes of the “shadow” and CBA effects is elusive in
our data.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first quasi-experimental evidence on
the impact of collective bargaining rights on police misconduct. In contemporaneous work,
5
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however, Goncalves (2019) uses a similar dataset from Florida (along with a national database of
fatal incidents) to analyze the impact of unionization on police misconduct. His empirical strategy
involves comparing Florida agencies in which unionization elections are successful to those with
unsuccessful elections and does not exploit the variation in collective bargaining rights that
Williams created. Using this approach, Goncalves (2019) finds statistically insignificant and
relatively small effects of unionization on misconduct. In Section 4 below, we discuss the
relationship between this paper and Goncalves (2019) in detail and seek to reconcile the
contrasting findings. While Goncalves (2019) has a different research question and empirical
strategy, there are clearly some overlapping elements. We conclude that our results are fairly
consistent with Goncalves’ (2019) where they overlap, but that the Williams quasi-experiment
provides a valuable source of variation for understanding the impact of collective bargaining
rights.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant legal developments relating
to collective bargaining rights under Florida law. Section 3 details our data sources. Section 4
presents our empirical strategy and results, along with a variety of robustness checks. Section 5
discusses these results, and Section 6 concludes.

2) Collective Bargaining Rights in Florida Law Enforcement Agencies
We begin with two general points of Florida law. First, Florida is a right-to-work state,
meaning that employees cannot be compelled to join or pay dues to the union that represents and
collectively bargains for their workforce (Fla. Const., Art. I, Sec. 6). The U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Janus v. AFSCME (138 S.Ct. 2448 [2018]), issued after our study period ended,
essentially imposed a right-to-work rule on public sector unions nationwide. Nevertheless, during
the pertinent period, unions were generally weaker in right-to-work states than in non-right-towork states. According to Putchinski (2007, p. 71), “[u]nions in Florida, including police unions,
experience[d] relatively lower membership rates with subsequent lower resources and funds as a
result of . . . right-to-work legislation.”
Second, Florida provides by statute a Law Enforcement Officer Bill of Rights
(“LEOBOR”), which includes a variety of procedural protections for officers facing disciplinary
investigations. One provision gives such an officer the right to “be informed of the nature of the
investigation before any interrogation begins” and to receive “all witness statements . . . and all
6
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other existing evidence, including, but not limited to, incident reports, GPS locator information,
and audio or video recordings relating to the incident under investigation, . . . before the beginning
of any investigative interview of that officer” (F.S.A. § 112.532(1)(d)). This complements another
requirement that “[a]ll identifiable witnesses shall be interviewed, whenever possible, prior to the
beginning of the investigative interview of the accused officer” (id.). Florida’s statutory procedural
protections leave less for unions to accomplish through collective bargaining, so bargaining might
be expected to have only a weak effect on law enforcement behavior.
This legal background ought to dull the effects of collective bargaining on law enforcement
behavior. As we discuss below, these are two of several reasons our study is biased against finding
effects from collective bargaining. We now turn to the specific change in Florida labor law that
forms the basis for our quasi-experiment.
2.1) The Florida Supreme Court’s Williams Decision of 2003
To test the causal relationship between collective bargaining rights and the behavior of law
enforcement officers, we exploit a 2003 change in Florida’s public sector labor law. Before 2003,
with a few exceptions detailed below, sheriff deputies in Florida, who are employed at the county
level, were not allowed to engage in collective bargaining. When the issue first arose in 1978, the
Florida Supreme Court unanimously held in Murphy v. Mack (358 So.2d 822) that state law did
not grant deputies collective bargaining rights because deputies were “appointees” rather than
“employees” of the sheriff. They were therefore not covered by a statute granting collective
bargaining rights to employees. That changed in January of 2003, when the Florida Supreme Court
held by a 4-3 vote in Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Association v. Williams (“Williams”) (838
So.2d 543) that deputies have the right to engage in collective bargaining.8 The court held that
Article I, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution granted deputies this right, invalidating any contrary
statute.

8

The change was foreshadowed by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Service Employees International Union
Local 16, AFL-CIO v. Public Employees Relations Commission in 2000 (752 So.2d 569). The court there decided a
statutory issue parallel to the one in Mack: whether deputy court clerks could unionize, which also depended on
whether they were “employees.” In holding that appointed deputies of court clerks were employees under the statute
granting collective bargaining rights, the court criticized its prior decision in Mack for “appear[ing] to have exalted
form over substance in contravention of the plain language and broad purpose of the [labor] Act” (p. 573). Soon after
this decision, the Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. sought certification as the collective bargaining
agent for employees of the Brevard County Sheriff’s Office and the litigation over that matter resulted in the Supreme
Court decision in Williams.

7
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Sheriffs’ deputies immediately began to organize for collective bargaining in substantial
numbers. Doerner and Doerner (2010, p. 368) report that, by the end of 2008, a total of 28 sheriffs’
offices (SOs) had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). These offices represented 15,581
sworn personnel or 76% of sheriff deputies in Florida. We document a similar pattern using our
dataset, as discussed in Section 3 below.
The significance of Williams for our research question stems from the fact that, by contrast
to sheriff deputies, Florida police officers, who are employed at the municipal level, were able to
bargain collectively starting in 1968 (Pynes and Corley 2006, p. 300; Dade County Teachers’
Association v. Ryan (225 So.2d 903, 905 [Fla. 1969])). They have done so to a significant extent
both before and after 2003. As we document in Section 3 below, slightly over half of Florida police
departments (PDs) had CBAs around 2003, representing about two-thirds of the police officers in
our principal dataset, and this fraction was quite stable over the time period we examine. Thus,
sheriff deputies after Williams experienced the impact of the introduction of collective bargaining
rights, whereas police officers (regardless of whether they had chosen to unionize) did not. In this
sense, PDs can serve as a control group in a quasi-experimental setting in which SOs, whose
deputies were awarded collective bargaining rights by the Williams decision, are the treatment
group.
Although the Williams decision has been noted in prior literature, it has not previously been
used to construct a quasi-experimental framework. Pynes and Corley (2006, p. 299) highlight
Williams as part of the “unusual history of collective bargaining” rights in Florida in an historical
account of collective bargaining rights among Florida law enforcement agencies. Doerner and
Doerner (2010) refer to the case but their empirical analysis uses data only on Florida SOs to
examine wage and benefits outcomes for SOs that unionize after Williams. Doerner and Doerner
(2013) extend their analysis to Florida PDs, but do not use PDs as a control group for SOs; the
source of variation is again derived from (potentially endogenous) unionization decisions.9 We
elaborate on our empirical design in Section 4 below.
2.2) Subsequent Developments: The “Legislative Body” Question

9

Bulman (2019) uses an empirical strategy that identifies the impact of the race of the sheriff on the racial composition
of arrests, controlling for the race of police department chiefs in the same county. While his approach also compares
SOs and PDs, the identification strategy and research question are very different from ours.

8
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One legal issue remained unresolved after 2003. Parties to collective bargaining sometimes
reach a bargaining impasse, in which they cannot agree on the terms of the employment contract.
Florida law provides that a public entity’s “legislative body” will resolve any impasse between the
entity and one of its public employee unions (F.S.A. § 447.403). Once deputies began to organize
in Florida, there was disagreement over the identity of the pertinent “legislative body.” Deputy
unions claimed it was the county commission. But sheriffs argued they were the legislative bodies,
meaning they could unilaterally resolve their own bargaining impasses. After several years of legal
uncertainty (see, for example, Ellman 2004; Moorhead 2008; Cravey 2008, 2009), a Florida Court
of Appeals twice held, consistent with the position of Florida’s Public Employee Relations
Commission, that the county commission was the appropriate impasse-resolving body (see, for
example, Sheriff of Pasco County v. Florida State Lodge (53 So.3d 1073 [Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010])). The Supreme Court of Florida effectively resolved the issue by denying discretionary
review of the first of these decisions (White v. Florida State Lodge (60 So.3d 236 [Fla. 2011])).
This change is potentially significant to our project. According to conventional thinking,
deputy unions have more bargaining power when the county’s commissioners resolve impasses
than when the sheriff does, which explains the parties’ litigation positions. Thus, it is possible that
the effect of the 2003 legal change on police misconduct did not fully manifest until after the 2011
resolution of the “legislative body” issue in favor of the unions. This constitutes another bias
against our finding any result for the earlier period.

3) Data
3.1) The ATMS Database
Our dataset combines information from various sources. A particularly crucial data source
for our analysis is the Automated Training Management System (ATMS) maintained by the FDLE.
The FDLE is a state-level agency that, among other things, collects data on the activities of local
law enforcement agencies and imposes discipline on officers in certain circumstances. The ATMS
database contains extensive information on Florida law enforcement officers. Most important for
our purposes, it records incidents of alleged officer misconduct. These allegations typically begin
as civilian or internal affairs complaints that are initiated or investigated by an officer’s local
agency (i.e., the employing SO or PD). If a local agency has cause to believe an officer has
committed (on or off the job) a felony or a misdemeanor involving dishonesty, or is not of “good
9
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moral character” (in ways enumerated by regulation), the agency must investigate. If the agency
sustains the allegation, it must submit its findings to the FDLE, which opens a “complaint” and
begins a disciplinary process (F.S.A. § 943.13(4), (7); F.A.C. Rule 11B-27.0011).
Complaints in the ATMS database are classified by source. The complaint-source
categories “Internal Affairs” and “Affidavit of Separation” both comprise complaints that, as just
described, were sustained by the local agency; the latter category is used when the local agency
has terminated the officer’s employment. These two categories, taken together, supply the majority
share of ATMS complaints. The FDLE also has information channels independent of the local
agencies, however. “Verifiable Complaints” include signed complaints from members of the
public; “Newspaper” includes incidents brought to the FDLE’s attention by media reports; “Arrest
Hit” captures incidents for which an officer was arrested and booked, alerting the FDLE; “FDLE”
covers incidents revealed during FDLE staff audits of local agency documents; and “Other”
captures any incidents not marked with one of the preceding codes.
Figure 1 presents a flowchart illustrating, in slightly simplified terms, the process by which
the FDLE handles the complaints it receives. Regardless of a complaint’s source, FDLE staff first
screen out complaints that do not, on their face, allege a “moral character” violation. For
complaints that pass this test, the process diverges depending upon the complaint’s source:
complaints that were already sustained by the employing agency’s internal affairs division are
usually forwarded to an FDLE “probable cause” panel, while complaints that originated through
some other channel (e.g., media reports) are first sent to the local agency and then, typically, to the
probable cause panel if the local agency sustains them. If the probable cause panel then finds
probable cause to proceed with formal charges against the officer’s certification to work in law
enforcement, the complaint advances to full FDLE commission review. Finally, if the commission
finds misconduct by “clear and convincing” evidence, it may discipline the officer pursuant to
established disciplinary guidelines (even though the officer might have already been disciplined
by the local agency).
Note that “probable cause” takes a meaning here different from in other legal settings,
where it indicates only a “fair probability” of wrongdoing (Illinois v. Gates (462 U.S. 213, 238
[1983])). A finding of “no probable cause” does not suggest that there is no fair probability of
misconduct; to the contrary, FDLE staff do not present a complaint to the probable cause panel
unless they believe the evidence is sufficient to prove the misconduct by “clear and convincing”
10
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evidence. The probable cause panel can enter a finding of “no probable cause” to proceed with
formal charges for any number of reasons unrelated to the strength of the evidence. The panel may
conclude, for example, that the officer has offered a reasonable explanation for his misconduct,
that the employing agency has already imposed sufficient discipline, or that the misconduct, while
qualifying as a “moral character” violation, is too minor to justify use of the formal disciplinary
apparatus.
The ATMS database records, for each complaint, the nature of the misconduct, the source
of the complaint, the officer, the officer’s agency, the date on which the complaint was opened,
and the disposition of the complaint. As we aggregate this data to the agency-year level, we can
use only incidents for which we have, or can infer, the officer’s agency and the year in which the
complaint was opened. About 15% of complaints are missing the date on which the case was
opened, while 9% of complaints are missing the officer’s agency. Using a field indicating when
the FDLE received case-related documentation, we are able to fill in missing year information for
most of the complaints. In some instances, where the case reaches the FDLE only after a lengthy
internal affairs process at the local agency, the FDLE may open its complaint in a year later than
the year in which the underlying incident took place. That Florida law typically requires internal
affairs investigations to be completed within 180 days (F.S.A. § 112.532(6)), however, suggests
this problem is not too severe. Furthermore, where the FDLE learns of the incident through an
officer’s arrest or from media reports, it will open a complaint typically within days.
The database uses 275 different offense codes to characterize the nature of the misconduct.
We focus on complaints that involve either express or implied violence, including sexual violence,
as these incidents trigger the greatest public concern. They are also most distinctively characteristic
of law enforcement activity and arguably less susceptible than other incidents to changes in
reporting behavior that might accompany unionization. We thus separate out 66 of the 275 ATMS
codes as involving violence, the threat of violence, or related attributes. We observe positive
numbers of incidents for 47 of these 66 codes and find a total of 2158 violent incidents across all
agencies over 1996-2015.10 The 47 codes are listed in the Appendix, along with the corresponding

10

Note that, as we drop 9 SOs that were not affected by Williams, the total number of violent incidents in the baseline
estimation sample is slightly smaller.
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number of incidents of that type for our baseline measure of violent incidents and for two
alternative measures (described below).11
While we include all 47 codes in the Appendix for completeness, most violent incidents
fall into a small number of major categories. Assault or aggravated assault constitutes about 23%
of violent incidents, while about 21% are in the “excessive force” category. About 20% of violent
incidents are classified as “Battery – Domestic Violence” (although the results are quite similar
when this category of violent incidents is omitted from the analysis, as discussed in Section 4.4.1).
Another 17% of violent incidents involve sexual assault or other sexual offenses.
The ATMS data does not record the identity of the victim(s) of the officer’s conduct but it
seems reasonable to assume that most of the incidents in these 49 categories involve civilian
victims. We refer to incidents falling within these 47 categories as “violent incidents.” Our
procedure was to include misconduct with any plausible violence, actual or threatened, express or
implied, but to exclude those types of misconduct with no violence. Typical instances of excluded
categories involve various forms of drug or alcohol abuse, corruption, theft, or embezzlement or
other financial impropriety. While in many cases quite serious, these types of misconduct are less
tied to the distinctive role of law enforcement officers than are violent incidents and have been less
often the subject of public debate.
As discussed in Section 4 below, officers at SOs and PDs perform generally similar duties.
In one respect, however, SOs and PDs do meaningfully differ. Peace officers in Florida are
generally certified in “law enforcement,” “corrections,” or both (known as “concurrent”
certification). SOs employ a much greater proportion of certified corrections officers than do PDs.
Moreover, violent incidents involving corrections officers may be driven by quite different factors
from those involving law enforcement officers. Thus, we restrict our analysis to officers who are
certified in law enforcement, either with or (more typically) without concurrent certification in
corrections. Anecdotally, it is believed that most officers with concurrent certification in Florida
primarily perform law enforcement activities (Baker 2017b). However, as a robustness check, we
restrict our analysis to officers who are certified only in law enforcement and find very similar
results.
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Incidents can have multiple offense codes if the officer’s conduct falls within more than one of the 275 different
offense types. For such incidents, one offense code is listed as the “major” offense code. Our classification of incidents
treats them as “violent incidents” if any of the offense codes is among those listed in the Appendix.
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We extract from the ATMS database information on the number of violent incidents
involving law enforcement and concurrently certified officers. We aggregate this number to the
agency-year level – for instance, we compute the number of violent incidents associated with
officers employed at the Broward County SO in 2002. The vast majority of these observations –
about 82% – are zeroes. That is, for 82% of agency-years, the agency had no violent incidents
reported in the ATMS database in that year.
In addition to its records of misconduct, the ATMS contains an employment database that
reports the agency affiliation and demographic characteristics of all Florida law enforcement
officers. We use this database to fill in missing agency data for some of the complaints. In addition,
the employment database enables us to construct variables for the total number of officers in an
agency-year and a number of demographic variables capturing the racial and gender composition
of officers in each agency-year. While the demographic variables are not used in our primary
analysis, we employ them for some supplemental tests. Our baseline sample contains nonmissing
data on the two key variables – the number of violent incidents and the number of officers – for
all agencies in all years over the 1996-2015 period, and is thus a balanced panel.12
3.2) Other Variables
Our dataset also includes information from the annual CJAP survey conducted by the
FDLE. The FDLE is a state-level agency that, among other things, collects data on the activities
of local law enforcement agencies. The CJAP data is universal, covering all law enforcement
agencies in the state, including both SOs and PDs. Importantly, the available surveys cover the
period 1996-2015, spanning the Williams decision and its aftermath. The CJAP database reports
extensive information about each agency at the agency-year level.13 Most important for our
purposes, it records whether a CBA existed for each law enforcement agency in Florida in each
year over the period 2000-2015. Unfortunately, CBA status was not recorded in surveys prior to
2000. There is some missing data on the CBA variable over 2000-2015, amounting to about 10%
of agency-year observations. To address the problem of missing values, we impute CBA status for
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Nine out of the 238 agencies in our baseline estimating sample, however, have some missing values for some of the
control variables described in Section 3.2. The results are virtually identical when these agencies are omitted.
13
This information includes, for instance, the length of the training period required of new officers under a field
training officer, the types of firearms (handguns, shotguns, and rifles) the agency issues to each officer, and the
minimum education requirements for new officers (typically a high school diploma or equivalent but occasionally
some college credit). We find no robustly significant effects of collective bargaining rights on any of these variables.
Some salary information is reported in CJAP but, unfortunately, the coverage is quite limited.
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agency-years where it is missing but the agency had identical nonmissing values for both the prior
year and the succeeding year. For example, suppose an agency reports having a CBA in 2005 and
2007 but the CBA variable is missing for that agency in 2006. We infer that the agency also had a
CBA in 2006. This imputation procedure reduces the prevalence of missing values from 10% to
2%. Moreover, all results reported below using the CBA variable are robust to omitting the
imputed values.
Control variables for the analysis are obtained from a number of additional sources. We
use U.S. Census Bureau estimates of county population size, the fraction of the county population
aged 20 to 24, and the racial and ethnic composition of the county population (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1996-2015). Unemployment rates at the county level are obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor 1996-2015). The number of arrests by each law
enforcement agency in each year is obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform
Crime Reporting (UCR) system (U.S. Department of Justice 1996-2015). The UCR system also
provides data on crime rates, which are used as an alternative to arrests in our robustness checks.
3.3) Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis, separately for the
treatment and control groups before and after Williams. The control group consists of all PDs for
which data is available. In defining SOs for purposes of this analysis, we account for the fact that
nine of the 67 SOs in Florida had obtained county-specific legislation before 2003 allowing them
to engage in collective bargaining.14 These SOs were unaffected by Williams. We thus exclude
them from our baseline analysis, though the results are very similar if we reclassify them as part
of the control group. The SO category used in Table 1 includes only the remaining 58 SOs; about
18% of our observations are on these SOs, while the rest are on PDs. As Williams was decided in
January 2003, the post-Williams period (2003-2015) includes 2003.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest a relative increase after Williams in violent
incidents for the 58 SOs in our treatment group, when compared to PDs. The mean number of
violent incidents among SOs increased from 0.51 to 0.62 (about a 22% increase). The mean
number of violent incidents among PDs fell from 0.24 to about 0.2 (about a 17% decrease). Table
1 also reports summary statistics for the control variables. The SOs and PDs differ along some
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These SOs are Broward, Charlotte, Escambia, Flagler, Jacksonville, Miami-Dade, Monroe, Nassau, and Volusia
(Doerner and Doerner 2010, pp. 382-83).
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dimensions with respect to the control variables. PDs tend, on average, to employ fewer sworn law
enforcement and concurrent officers. PDs are also more likely to be located in areas with larger
and more diverse populations. These differences tend to hold both before and after Williams,
however. Moreover, the regression analysis described below controls for changes in these
variables.
A first step in the study is to verify that Williams did indeed impact collective bargaining
activity among SOs. Figure 2 plots the fraction of SOs and PDs with CBAs, as reported in the
CJAP data over 2000-2015. As the treatment group excludes the nine SOs that had obtained
collective bargaining rights before Williams, this fraction is initially zero for the treatment SOs.
After Williams was decided in January 2003, collective bargaining activity begins among SOs
within the same year. The fraction of SOs with CBAs keeps rising for about three years, before
stabilizing around 2006. Another important point to note from Figure 2 is that the fraction of PDs
with CBAs remains quite stable, at a little over a half, throughout this period. This suggests that,
while collective bargaining may potentially affect outcomes for PDs, this impact is unlikely to
have changed before and after Williams.

4) Empirical Analysis
4.1) Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy involves comparing violent incidents at SOs and PDs before and
after the Williams decision. This approach has a number of advantages over those in the existing
literature. Prior studies of the impact of law enforcement unions use potentially endogenous
unionization decisions (Anzia and Moe 2014) or potentially endogenous changes in state law with
respect to public sector unions (Frandsen 2014; Ichniowski, Freeman, and Lauer 1989), creating
challenges to causal inference. Similarly, if we were merely to examine the effects of CBAs on
misconduct, one important source of potential endogeneity is that agencies in which officers
anticipate an increasing number of violent incidents, or an increasing probability of their detection,
may be inclined to unionize. This would potentially bias the estimated coefficient upwards. But it
is also possible that, in other circumstances, the estimated coefficient would be biased downwards.
It may be, for example, that when unobserved morale is high, officers are more likely to resolve
conflict with citizens without violence and also to succeed in winning unionization elections. Our
approach avoids these challenges by focusing on the (exogenous) conferral of collective
15
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bargaining rights rather than the (potentially endogenous) adoption of CBAs. It also holds statelevel factors constant by focusing on quasi-experimental variation across agencies in the same
state.
Our strategy requires basic comparability between SOs and PDs. Officers at agencies in
the treatment and control groups perform similar job functions, with the exception of the larger
fraction of corrections officers at SOs, which we address by excluding corrections officers from
our dataset. Indeed, Pynes and Corley (2006, p. 299) highlight “the similarities in job duties”
between sheriff deputies and police officers, which suggests that PDs are in general a good
comparison group for SOs.15 Moreover, any minor differences in job duties are unlikely to have
changed at the time of the Williams decision. Likewise, similar pools of applicants reportedly seek
employment with SOs and PDs, and there is lateral movement by officers between the agency
types (Baker 2017a).
In implementing this empirical strategy in a regression framework, we bear in mind that
the dependent variable (violent incidents) takes only non-negative integer values and thus is an
example of “count” data. Moreover, it includes many zero-value observations, as noted above.
Although linear specifications are generally highly flexible and robust, there are a number of
problems with using a standard linear model in these circumstances. Due to the skewness of the
data and the large number of zeroes, the normality-of-errors assumption is difficult to satisfy with
any feasible transformation. It is thus common in these circumstances to use a specification that
better accommodates count data (e.g., Krueger and Mas 2004; Ellison and Swanson 2016;
Chandrasekher 2017).
In particular, we use the Poisson maximum-likelihood model:
𝑌

exp 𝛽 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂

𝛽 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑠

γ𝐗

𝜇

𝛿 𝜖

(1)

𝑌 represents the number of violent incidents matched to (law enforcement and concurrently
certified) officers at agency i in year t. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one for the years
after Williams. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 includes 2003 because the decision was made in January of that year. 𝑆𝑂 is
an indicator variable equal to one if agency i is part of the treatment group – i.e., any SO other
than the 9 SOs that obtained collective bargaining rights by special dispensation prior to 2003 and
that are excluded from the analysis. The interaction term 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂

is our variable of interest.
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One minor distinction between sheriff deputies and police officers is that only deputies serve court papers, such as
injunctions (Baker 2017a).
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𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑠 is the number of sworn officers (certified in law enforcement or concurrently
certified) employed at agency i in year t. Equation (1) uses the number of violent incidents as the
dependent variable while controlling for the number of officers, rather than using the violent
incident rate. This specification is more flexible in many respects and the number of incidents
tends to be less noisy than the rate. Using the the violent incident rate yields quite similar results,
however (as reported in Section 4.4.4).
𝐗 is a vector of control variables, which includes the demographic characteristics in year
t of the county in which agency i is located. In particular, these are the size of the resident
population, the fraction of the resident population aged 18-24, the fraction of the resident
population that is Hispanic, and the fraction of the resident population that is African American.
Local economic conditions are captured by the county’s unemployment rate in year t. The
unemployment rate in part serves as a proxy for incentives to commit crime, but also provides a
measure of officers’ outside options in the local area, and hence the opportunity cost of
misconduct. The total number of arrests made by agency i in year t is included as a measure of the
extent of contact officers in agency i in year t have with the civilian population. The basic results
are robust, however, to using crime rates – the number of murders, property crimes, and violent
crimes in agency i’s jurisdiction in year t – instead of arrests. 𝜇 is an agency fixed effect and 𝛿 is
a year fixed effect, while 𝜖 is the error term.
The inclusion of these controls affects the interpretation of our results. In particular, the
number of officers and the number of arrests may potentially be affected by collective bargaining
rights or unionization. By controlling for these variables in our baseline analysis – and hence for
the size of the agency and the scale and nature of its law enforcement activities – we seek to isolate
the impact of collective bargaining rights per se (absent such aggregate impacts). It is possible that
collective bargaining rights may also affect the aggregate amount of misconduct by changing the
size of agencies and the scope of their activities. While this aggregate effect is not what we aim to
estimate, it is worth noting that our basic result holds whether we include these controls or exclude
them.
The Poisson distribution assumes that the variance is equal to the mean, although in many
applications of count data the variance exceeds the mean, a situation referred to as “overdispersion.” Over-dispersion may lead to standard errors that are too small. We address this issue
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by computing robust standard errors (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi 1998, pp. 63-65; Krueger and Mas
2004, p. 268) that are clustered at the agency level.16
A crucial assumption of our difference-in-difference approach is that SOs and PDs
experienced similar trends in violent incidents prior to Williams. To illustrate this and to further
motivate the analysis, Figure 3 plots a natural representation of the mean number of violent
incidents for the treatment and control groups over 1996-2015. We begin by running a Poisson
regression of the number of violent incidents on agency fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the
number of law enforcement and concurrently certified officers associated with each agency-year.
This is a simplified version of Equation (1) that de-means the data and controls for common time
shocks and for changes in the size of agencies. We then compute the residuals from this regression.
Figure 3 shows the mean of these residuals, computed separately for SOs and PDs for each year.
It is readily apparent that the mean residual of violent incidents rises substantially for SOs
following Williams. Although the time series is quite noisy, the residuals are negative in most preWilliams years and tend to be positive in post-Williams years. The mean residual of violent
incidents for PDs, in contrast, is fairly stable and close to zero throughout the sample period.
Moreover, the mean residuals for the two types of agencies follow what appear to be parallel trends
prior to Williams, though there is also a certain amount of noise here as well.17
To smooth out the noise apparent in Figure 3, we show in Figure 4 the lines of best fit for
the residuals from the simple Poisson regression described above, separately for SOs and PDs,
first over 1996-2002. Note that this uses the residuals at the agency level for each year rather than
the mean residuals averaged over all SOs and over all PDs. The resulting lines represent time
trends in violent incidents for SOs and PDs, controlling for agency fixed effects, year fixed effects,
and the number of officers. As shown in Figure 4, these are closely parallel prior to Williams. For
the post-Williams period, where a larger number of years is available, we use a more flexible local
polynomial approach with a quadratic specification. Again, this shows a substantial increase in the
residual number of violent incidents at SOs after Williams, relative to the fairly stable residual
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A variant of the Poisson model, known as the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) specification, is designed to accommodate
situations where the data includes a particularly large number of zeroes. Available implementations of the ZIP model
do not allow for fixed effects, however, and thus we would be unable to control for unobserved heterogeneity across
agencies. Moreover, the ZIP model requires an exclusion restriction – a variable that affects the probability of a zero
observation, while not affecting the magnitude of nonzero observations – that is not readily available in our setting.
17
There is a noticeable spike in violent incidents at SOs in 2006. Reassuringly, the regression results are robust to
excluding all observations for 2006 (as reported in Table 4, Column 3 and discussed in Section 4.4.1 below).
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number for PDs. After the immediate post-Williams years, the residual number of violent incidents
at SOs appears to fall and then stabilize. It is unclear from Figure 4 whether this results in a longrun level that is similar to or higher than the pre-Williams level. In the regression analysis,
however, we show that the effect of Williams is persistent rather than transitory – violent incidents
in the final years of the sample (excluding the immediate post-Williams years) are higher than in
the pre-Williams period (see Table 2, Column 4).
4.2) Basic Regression Results
The results from the specification in Equation (1) are reported in Table 2. The maximal
sample over 1996-2015 consists of 6320 observations at the agency-year level on 316 agencies (58
SOs and 258 PDs). Fixed-effects Poisson estimation, however, automatically omits agencies for
which the number of violent incidents is always zero, as well as any agencies that appear in the
dataset for only one year. The sample in Column 1 thus consists of 4760 observations on 238
agencies, and is slightly smaller in Column 2 when controls are added because of missing data on
control variables. (Note, however, that the results in Column 2 are virtually identical when omitting
the 9 agencies that have some missing values for certain control variables and thus using a fully
balanced panel.) The reported standard errors are robust and clustered at the agency level, here and
throughout the tables. Column 1 includes agency and year fixed effects but no controls apart from
the number of officers, which we include in order to scale the number of violent incidents by
agency size. The variable of interest is the interaction of a post-Williams dummy with a dummy
for SOs. This has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5% level. The estimate
(of about 0.34) is very similar in magnitude and significance when adding the extensive set of
demographic, economic, and arrest controls described previously (Column 2).
As the Poisson specification takes an exponential form, the percentage impact of Williams
on violent incidents is given by 100 𝑒

.

1 , holding all other independent variables fixed.

Thus, the estimated coefficient implies that collective bargaining rights lead to a substantial 40%
increase in complaints of violent officer misconduct. While this may seem implausibly large, the
baseline frequency of violent incidents is low. The mean number of violent incidents per year for
SOs prior to Williams is about 0.5, while the mean number of officers at SOs in the pre-Williams
period is 210. The estimated effect thus implies an increase of about 0.2 complaints per year for a
typical SO, from 0.5 to 0.7. That corresponds to one officer (out of 210) being involved in an
additional violent incident over a five-year period. Viewed this way, the estimated effect does not
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seem overly large, while still suggesting a substantial divergence in violent incidents between SOs
and PDs following Williams.18
The baseline analysis in Columns 1 and 2 uses the full sample period 1996-2015. This is
fairly long, especially for the post-Williams period. In Column 3, we focus on a narrower window
immediately around 2003: the period 1999-2006. The estimated effect over this shorter period
remains statistically significant despite the substantially smaller sample size and is somewhat
larger in magnitude.
As noted previously, it is not readily apparent from Figures 3 and 4 whether the Williams
effect persists over time or reverses – i.e., whether SOs experience a permanently higher level of
violent incidents post-Williams or whether violent incidents spike for only a few years and then
converge to the counterfactual level. To test this formally, we adopt the following approach. We
exclude from our sample the immediate post-Williams years (2003-2008) and compare violent
incidents over 2009-2016 to those over the pre-Williams period (1996-2002). If the level of violent
incidents becomes permanently higher for SOs, we should detect this effect in the later time period.
Column 4 of Table 2 reports this estimate: it is very similar in magnitude to the baseline estimate
in Column 2 and is statistically significant. This result suggests that the conferral of collective
bargaining rights led to a sustained increase in the level of violent incidents at SOs.
4.3) The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements
Although Williams conferred collective bargaining rights on all SOs, only a subset of SOs
ultimately adopted CBAs. By 2006, 18 SOs (representing 56% of sheriffs’ deputies in our principal
dataset) had CBAs while 38 did not; the CBA variable in the CJAP data is missing for the other 2
SOs. This situation remained virtually unchanged for the rest of our sample period. It is thus
possible to examine separately the impact of Williams on the subset of SOs that subsequently
adopted CBAs and the subset of SOs that did not. In doing so, we seek to distinguish between the
impact of CBAs per se and the impact of bargaining in the shadow of collective bargaining rights.
The former would apply only to the subset of SOs that adopted CBAs, while the latter would apply
to all SOs.

18

Goncalves (2019) characterizes effects of unionization on misconduct of up to about 20% as being “small” and
indicative of a “precise zero” result. In comparison, our estimate of the effect of collective bargaining rights is larger,
but not dramatically so. This underscores that our estimate does not seem implausibly large when viewed in context.
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This test is important because a potential alternative explanation for a post-Williams
increase in reported violent incidents within SOs is that unionization may result in greater
bureaucratization of the investigation process. Even with no increase in actual misconduct, sheriffs
forced to bargain collectively with a deputies’ union might begin to formally investigate, record,
and report violent incidents to the FDLE when previously they would have handled the matter
informally and the incident would not have entered the dataset. Both subsets of SOs (with and
without CBAs) are “treated” in our design, as the treatment is obtaining collective bargaining rights
rather than executing a CBA. Only those SOs that adopted CBAs ought to have undergone the
bureaucratization process associated with unionization, however, and so any evidence of a
“shadow” effect among non-CBA SOs casts doubt on this alternative explanation.
In addition, the exercise of separating SOs with and without CBAs helps to pinpoint
whether the mechanism underlying our basic result involves collective bargaining. It can also be
viewed as a type of falsification test – if the baseline effect appears only or even primarily among
those SOs without CBAs, that may cast doubt on whether the post-2003 divergence in violent
incidents at SOs and PDs is attributable to Williams. It should be stressed, however, that the
existence of some effect among non-CBA SOs is not in itself problematic, as this would simply
reflect bargaining in the shadow of collective bargaining rights. As previously discussed, there is
considerable evidence in the labor economics literature of such “shadow” effects.
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results of estimating Equation (1) using as the treatment
group only those SOs that subsequently adopted CBAs. We define this treatment group as
consisting of all SOs that had a CBA in any (post-Williams) year of our sample period; however,
in virtually all cases, CBAs were adopted by 2006. The control group (as in the baseline analysis)
consists of all PDs. As shown in Column 1, the estimated effect for this subset of SOs is positive,
statistically significant, and somewhat larger than the baseline effect for all SOs (Column 2 of
Table 2). Column 2 of Table 3 reports the results of estimating Equation (1) using as the treatment
group only those SOs that never adopted CBAs. The estimated effect for this subset of SOs is of
borderline statistical significance and somewhat smaller than the baseline effect for all SOs.
These results suggest a stronger effect among SOs that subsequently adopted CBAs and a
weaker effect among those that did not. The direction of this difference is consistent with our
expectations – that is, with a substantial effect of bargaining in the shadow of collective bargaining
rights and a further incremental impact of adopting a CBA. The existence of some (albeit weaker)
21
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effect for SOs without CBAs provides some evidence of bargaining in the shadow of collective
bargaining rights. It also suggests that bureaucratization cannot fully account for our results, as
even SOs that did not unionize appear to have experienced an increase in violent incidents relative
to PDs.
Nevertheless, the confidence intervals for the estimates in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3
overlap. It is thus not possible to distinguish these effects statistically. This may be because SOs
adopted CBAs shortly after Williams, mostly between 2003 and 2006, including nine SOs in 2003
itself. This timing makes it difficult to disentangle the “shadow” effect from the CBA effect, as
does the relatively small number of SOs in each subset.
A slightly different way to make this point is to augment Equation (1) with a triple
interaction term, interacting the post-Williams period with the SO indicator and with an indicator
for the existence of a CBA:
𝑌

exp 𝛽 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂

𝛽 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂 ∗ 𝐶𝐵𝐴

𝛽 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑠

γ𝐗

𝛿 𝜖

𝜇
(2)

Here, 𝐶𝐵𝐴 is an indicator variable equal to one if a CBA is reported as existing for agency i in
year t. The baseline 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂

term now captures the impact of Williams on violent incidents,

which can be interpreted primarily as a “shadow” effect. The triple interaction term
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂 ∗ 𝐶𝐵𝐴

captures the incremental increase in violent incidents at SOs that have a

CBA in year t, with the implicit control group being SOs without a CBA in that year.
Column 3 of Table 3 reports the results from the specification in Equation (2). Note that,
because 𝐶𝐵𝐴 is available only from 2000, the sample period here is 2000-2015. The baseline
Williams effect is positive and statistically significant, indicating a substantial “shadow” effect.
The coefficient on the triple interaction term is positive and fairly sizable, consistent with an
additional increase in violent incidents following the adoption of a CBA. It falls short of statistical
significance, however. This may be due to the relatively small number of SOs, recalling that the
triple interaction term compares SOs that have a CBA in a particular year to SOs that do not have
one in that year.
Yet another approach is to focus more directly on the estimated coefficient of 𝐶𝐵𝐴 for
SOs, using as the implicit control group all PDs as well as SOs that do not have a CBA in year t:
𝑌

exp 𝛽 𝐶𝐵𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑂

𝛽 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑠

γ𝐗

𝜇

𝛿 𝜖
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(3)

Note that, in principle, it is possible to instrument for 𝐶𝐵𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑂 using the interaction between
the post-Williams years and 𝑆𝑂 in an instrumental variables (IV) framework. In a linear IV model
(with agency and year fixed effects), however, the first-stage F-statistic is not sufficiently large to
overcome concerns about the instrument’s strength. This is possibly because the number of SOs is
relatively small in relation to PDs, so that the exogenous variation created by Williams thus applies
only to a relatively small fraction of all agencies.
Column 4 of Table 3 reports the results from the specification in Equation (3). It shows
that CBAs among SOs are associated with a statistically significant and sizable increase in violent
incidents. Thus, examining the adoption of CBAs by SOs generally supports our basic claims, even
though the decomposition of our baseline estimate into a shadow effect and a CBA effect is elusive
given the available variation in our data. If we instead use all of the variation in 𝐶𝐵𝐴 (for PDs as
well as SOs) in a “naïve” panel specification that ignores endogeneity concerns, however, we do
not detect a statistically significant association between CBAs and violent incidents. For SOs alone
(as in Column 4 of Table 3), self-selection is less of a concern because CBAs were adopted over a
relatively short period (primarily 2003-2006) soon after the Williams decision. SOs’ CBAs are
thus less likely to have been pursued endogenously in a manner that may bias estimates of their
impact on violent incidents. SOs were exogenously unable to unionize prior to Williams, in other
words, and so at least the timing of their CBA adoption is partially exogenous.
The absence of an association between CBAs and violent incidents in the full sample may
also help reconcile our results with the apparently contrasting findings in the contemporaneous
work of Goncalves (2019). While also using a national database of fatal incidents, Goncalves
(2019) analyzes the impact of unionization on police misconduct using FDLE data from Florida.
His study differs from ours along a number of important dimensions. His research question
concerns unionization rather than collective bargaining rights. The empirical strategy – using handcollected data on unionization elections – involves comparing Florida agencies (predominantly
PDs) in which unionization elections are successful to those in which they are not. Goncalves
(2019) does not use the variation in collective bargaining rights across SOs and PDs created by
Williams and cannot detect any “shadow” effects of collective bargaining rights. Finally,
Goncalves’ (2019) misconduct measure is not restricted to violent incidents.
Despite these differences, the papers do contain some overlapping elements, and so it is
worth discussing the relationship between them, especially in view of the apparently differing
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results: Goncalves (2019) finds no statistically significant effect of unionization on misconduct
and his estimates rule out a positive effect greater than about 10% to 20%. The differing results
using similar Florida data may seem puzzling, especially if one views the conferral of collective
bargaining rights as an “intent-to-treat” and unionization as the actual treatment (although, as
discussed earlier, this is not our preferred interpretation). Note, however, that the two results are
not necessarily inconsistent. It could be the case, in principle, that bargaining in the shadow of
collective bargaining rights is sufficiently effective with respect to (formal or de facto) procedural
protections that actual unionization does not have any detectable incremental effect. This would
raise the question of why officers would ever choose to unionize in such a scenario, but it may be
that bargaining in the shadow of collective bargaining rights is less effective with respect to wages
and benefits than procedural protections.
While we do not have data on unionization elections, the Goncalves (2019) result is
consistent with what we find when regressing violent incidents on unionization for the full sample
(i.e., both PDs and SOs) or for PDs alone. In that sense, the results of the two papers are fairly
consistent in the sphere in which they overlap. Our argument in this paper, however, is that the
Williams decision provides a source of exogenous variation that reveals the causal impact of
collective bargaining on misconduct in a way that cannot otherwise be replicated (for instance, by
studying the effect of unionization). The impact of Williams is manifested both directly, as the
difference-in-difference Williams effect (our baseline result in Table 2, Column 2), and indirectly,
by generating exogenous variation in the timing of SOs’ adoption of CBAs (as in Table 3, Column
4). We thus contend that the evidence from Williams is crucial in understanding the causal effect
of collective bargaining on law enforcement behavior.
4.4) Robustness Checks and Extensions
Our baseline result withstands a variety of robustness checks, some of which have been
noted earlier in the paper. Several of the key tests are reported in Table 4 but many others are
briefly summarized and not reported in the interests of brevity.
4.4.1) Potential Measurement Error in Measuring Violent Incidents
As noted in Section 3 above, in some instances the FDLE does not sustain a complaint.
This could be because the incident, though “misconduct” in a colloquial sense, did not satisfy the
legal definition for a “moral character” violation. It could also be because evidence of the incident
was insufficient to satisfy the FDLE’s “clear and convincing” evidence requirement.
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Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between these two possibilities. To ensure that our results do
not depend on complaints that potentially lack a factual basis, we construct two alternative
measures of “verified” violent incidents. We communicated with FDLE staff to identify five
terminal “complaint status” codes that indicate that a complaint may have lacked an adequate
factual basis – the employing agency may not have sustained the complaint (potentially for factual
insufficiency) or, in a small number of cases, the employing agency did sustain the complaint but
FDLE staff nevertheless concluded that the evidence would be insufficient to satisfy the FDLE’s
higher evidentiary standard. Complaints that terminate with these codes do not reach the FDLE’s
probable cause panel (see Figure 1).
Our first measure of “verified” violent incidents excludes all complaints that terminated
with one of the five codes just mentioned unless the complaint originated in the employing
agency’s internal affairs process, in which case we can be sure that the employing agency sustained
the allegation, because the complaint was forwarded to the FDLE. Column 1 of Table 4 reports
results using this variable. The estimated effect is statistically significant and similar in magnitude
to our baseline result. The second measure of “verified” violent incidents excludes all complaints
that terminated with one of the five codes, even if they originated in the employing agency’s
internal affairs process. The estimated effect using this variable, reported in Column 2 of Table 4,
is again statistically significant and similar in magnitude to the baseline effect. It should be
emphasized that both of these measures are conservative estimates of “verified” complaints
because they exclude some complaints that were screened out for “legal” rather than evidentiary
reasons – that is, they exclude complaints for which it was clear that some violence-related
misconduct occurred but the misconduct did not meet Florida’s legal definition of a “moral
character” violation. One example might be the use of force that violates a local agency’s relatively
restrictive use-of-force policy but is not considered “excessive force” sufficient to establish a
“moral character” violation on the FDLE’s view.
As is apparent in Figure 3, there is a noticeable spike in violent incidents at SOs in 2006.
Given the unusual nature of this spike, it is important to determine whether it may be attributable
to measurement error or to some extraneous factor (unrelated to Williams) that occurred in 2006.
Our searches of news sources and our communications with the FDLE have not uncovered any
alternative factor that would account for this pattern in the data. The distribution of sources of
complaints also did not change dramatically in 2006 relative to prior years. Reassuringly, the
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regression results are robust to excluding all observations for 2006 (as reported in Column 3 of
Table 4). The estimated effect of Williams on violent incidents is positive and statistically
significant, though somewhat smaller in magnitude. Thus, it does not appear that any unusual
factors specific to 2006 are driving the baseline result.
Finally, a significant fraction (about 20%) of violent incidents in our data involve domestic
violence. There is a strong conceptual case for including these incidents, which are likely to
involve civilian victims. In any event, the results are quite similar when violent incidents involving
domestic violence are omitted from our dataset.
4.4.2) Tests for Parallel Trends and Other Assumptions of the Difference-in-Difference
Approach
A key assumption of our difference-in-difference approach is that the treatment and control
groups experienced parallel trends in the period prior to the treatment. As discussed earlier, visual
inspection of the graphs in Figures 3 and 4 does not indicate that SOs and PDs experienced
different trends in violent incidents prior to Williams. It is possible in principle to add linear
agency-specific trends to Equation (1). This involves hundreds of additional variables, however,
and the Poisson maximum-likelihood procedure fails to converge. We can instead add two linear
trends, one for SOs and the other for PDs, which allows the average trend for the agency types
(though not for each individual agency) to differ. The results are quite similar. Adding leads of the
interaction term of interest to the specification in Equation (1) (e.g., Autor 2003) also suggests that
there were no differential effects for SOs and PDs in the years prior to Williams. Placebo tests (or
false experiments) that test for “effects” for years such as 2000 and 2001 – over the pre-Williams
period – yield insignificant coefficients that are close to zero, which also suggests the absence of
differential prior trends.
The broader comparability of our treatment and control groups is also crucial for the
credibility of our difference-in-difference approach. As noted earlier, the baseline analysis
excludes corrections officers (who are mostly found in SOs); it uses data on violent incidents
involving only officers certified solely in law enforcement or concurrently certified in corrections.
Omitting concurrently certified officers – and using violent incidents involving law enforcement
officers only – leads to essentially identical results.
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As discussed earlier, nine SOs adopted CBAs through special arrangements prior to
Williams. The baseline analysis omits these nine SOs altogether. Adding them to the control group
instead leads to very similar results.
A further important assumption of the difference-in-difference approach is that no other
factor changed differentially for SOs and PDs after 2003. One such possibility is that the increasing
use of smartphones to film law enforcement officers may explain the results. For example, if
smartphone penetration (or use) increased faster after Williams in areas patrolled by SOs than by
PDs, the apparent rise in violent incidents in SOs relative to PDs could reflect instead a (relative)
improvement in reporting and documentation of incidents in those areas. Fortunately for our
purposes, the popularization of filming law enforcement with smartphones appears to have
occurred too recently to explain our results (Ouss and Rappaport 2019).
4.4.3) Tests for Compositional Effects
The basic dataset, consisting of the number of violent incidents and the number of officers,
is a fully balanced panel with nonmissing data for all agencies in all years over 1996-2015. When
control variables are included, there are 9 agencies (out of 238) for which there is some missing
data on controls. The results when these agencies are excluded are virtually identical to the baseline
results. Changes over time in the composition of the treatment or control groups – where, for
instance, some agencies appear in the dataset only after Williams – are therefore not affecting the
results.
It is nonetheless possible that that the conferral of collective bargaining rights led to
compositional effects in the types of officers who are attracted to joining particular agencies,
especially those that are unionized versus those that are not. Such effects are most likely to occur
if the number of officers agencies employed expanded following Williams (or the adoption of
CBAs), although this is not a necessary condition. We find, however, little evidence that the basic
result is driven by changes in the number or observable characteristics of officers at SOs relative
to PDs after Williams. All of our regressions control for changes in the number of officers and, as
described below in Section 4.4.4, the result is robust to using the rate of violent incidents.
Moreover, adding to the basic model measures of the racial and gender composition of officers
does not affect the results.
To illustrate changes in agency size, Figure 5 plots the mean number of officers at SOs and
PDs. The latter is quite stable over time. The number of officers at SOs appears to have increased
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after Williams, but Figure 5 suggests that this was a continuation of a pre-existing trend. Thus,
there is no clear evidence that Williams caused an increase in the size of agencies; this arguably
reduces the scope for compositional effects to operate through an influx of new officers with
potentially different characteristics, such as being more prone to violent incidents or aggressive
policing. If such compositional changes in officer characteristics after Williams had occurred, they
might have also led to changes in arrest behavior and the number of arrests. Note, however, that
the number of arrests is one of the control variables in our baseline regression, implying that the
result is robust to any changes in arrest behavior. In addition, replacing arrests with crime rates as
an alternative measure of policing activity leads to virtually identical results. Overall, there is no
detectable evidence that our result is attributable to compositional effects, although it is impossible
to rule out changes in the unobservable characteristics of officers.
We emphasize that changes in the composition of officers per se are not necessarily a
challenge to the basic result. They might instead be viewed as a mechanism through which the
treatment effect of collective bargaining rights or unionization may operate on the treatment group.
A potential concern, however, is that the treatment may also affect the control group. In particular,
suppose that officers with a high risk of involvement in violent incidents tend to choose unionized
agencies. Unionization among SOs may then have induced violence-prone PD officers to move
from unionized PDs to unionized SOs, as Williams eliminated a particular disincentive to join SOs.
In this scenario, the treatment may have affected the control group through a compositional effect
that reduced the number of violence-prone officers. Of course, the change-in-composition
hypothesis assumes that violence-prone officers anticipate more lenient treatment in unionized
forces, which itself implies that the probability of detection and termination is lower in such
agencies.
One way to address this possibility is to drop all agencies with CBAs, so the analysis is
unaffected by officers’ sorting into unionized agencies. This results in a sample size of less than
half our baseline sample, primarily because the majority of PDs are unionized and some of those
that are not unionized are small and never have positive numbers of violent incidents. Nonetheless,
the result is quite similar to our baseline finding, suggesting that our baseline finding is robust to
the possibility that violence-prone officers sort into unionized agencies.
4.4.4) Alternative Model Specifications
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Our baseline specification (Equation (1)) models the number (or count) of violent incidents
(while controlling for the number of officers). An alternative approach is to model instead the rate
of violent incidents (i.e., the number of violent incidents scaled by the number of officers). In a
Poisson framework, the rate is modeled by modifying Equation (1) to include the natural logarithm
of the scaling variable (termed the “exposure” variable, in this case the number of officers), while
constraining its coefficient to equal one (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Column 4 of Table 4
shows the results from this specification. The basic result is robust to modeling the rate (rather
than number) of violent incidents.
More fundamentally, our preferred specification is a Poisson model for the reasons
discussed above, including the highly skewed nature of the data and the large fraction of zerovalue observations. Nevertheless, the Poisson model in Equation (1) has a number of potential
limitations, most obviously requiring that the error term follow a Poisson distribution. A linear
fixed effects model of the violent incident rate per hundred officers yields fairly similar results,
however: the coefficient implies about a 44% increase in the violent incident rate at SOs postWilliams. Log-linear specifications of the number and the rate per hundred officers of violent
incidents – in which an arbitrary constant is added to the dependent variable to retain zero-value
observations – also lead to fairly similar results. A linear probability model of an indicator variable
for whether an agency-year has any violent incidents also gives broadly consistent results. It
implies about a 5 percentage point increase in the probability that an agency has a violent incident,
relative to a mean of 18%. This suggests an effect along the extensive margin, with a larger fraction
of SOs experiencing violent incidents following Williams.
4.4.5) Extensions
We described in Section 2.2 the legal developments with respect to the “legislative body”
question that lingered after Williams. To the extent the definition of the legislative body, which
resolves bargaining impasses, matters for misconduct, resolution of legal uncertainty about this
issue – which occurred around 2010 or 2011 in the deputies’ favor – may have generated additional
effects. The similarity of the estimate in Column 4 of Table 2 to the baseline estimate, however,
seems to suggest that resolution of the “legislative body” question in fact had little independent
impact on violent incidents.
We explicitly test for the effect of these later legal developments by running a differencein-difference model analogous to Equation (1), with the variable of interest defined as an
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interaction between an indicator for post-2010 years and an indicator for SOs. This is run over the
sample period 2003-2015, to focus only on the post-Williams period. The estimated coefficient is
close to zero and statistically insignificant. The test thus does not reveal any detectable effect from
resolution of the “legislative body” question on the number of violent incidents and suggests that
the impact of Williams has largely been captured by our earlier results (in Table 2). It is, however,
fairly imprecisely estimated, so that an effect of similar magnitude to the baseline effect in Table
2, Column 2 cannot be ruled out at the 95% level.
A potentially interesting question is the extent to which agency characteristics may mediate
the estimated effect of collective bargaining rights on violent incidents. For example, we examine
whether the racial diversity of agencies influences the size of the effect by adding an interaction
between 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂

and the fraction of African American officers in an agency-year, with the

latter variable also added separately to the model. The coefficient on this interaction term is
negative – consistent with greater racial diversity mitigating the effect of collective bargaining
rights on violent incidents – however, it is not statistically significant. We also test for an
intermediating effect of the gender of officers by adding an interaction between 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂
and the fraction of male officers in an agency-year, with the latter variable also added separately
to the model. The coefficient on this interaction term is positive – consistent with a greater fraction
of male officers magnifying the effect of collective bargaining rights on violent incidents –
however, again it is not statistically significant.

5) Discussion
The determinants of law enforcement misconduct have become a question of wide interest
to scholars, policymakers, and the public. We provide what we believe to be the first quasiexperimental evidence on the impact of collective bargaining rights on misconduct by law
enforcement officers. Using a comprehensive state administrative database of “moral character”
violations reported by local agencies in Florida and an empirical strategy based on the Florida
Supreme Court’s Williams decision of 2003, we show that the conferral of collective bargaining
rights on officers at SOs led to an increase in violent incidents, relative to a control group of PDs
that were unaffected by Williams. These results are robust to a wide variety of robustness checks
and tests for alternative explanations.
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While some of these points have been raised earlier, it is worth reiterating several sources
of potential bias against these findings. First, Florida is a right-to-work state, which generally limits
the ability of employees to organize effectively. Second, Florida has a statutory LEOBOR that
applies to all law enforcement officers, leaving less space for collective bargaining to secure
procedural protections from disciplinary investigations. Third, the existence of a state-level FDLE
disciplinary mechanism also limits the effect of collective bargaining for law enforcement officers
in Florida compared to states that lack this sanction. Whereas individual agencies can at most
terminate an officer, the FDLE has the power to “decertify” officers so they cannot be hired by
any other law enforcement agency in the state; this power is not easily cabined by collective
bargaining. CBAs can lower the probability of detecting misconduct, but a given decrease in the
probability of detection will detract less from deterrence in states with the decertification sanction
than in states with only a local sanction. Fourth, the Service Employees case discussed in section
2 – holding that appointed deputies of court clerks were “employees” under the statute granting
employees collective bargaining rights – may have led to anticipation of the Williams outcome and
perhaps to bargaining in the shadow of that outcome. This would dampen the observed impact of
the Williams decision.
An important issue to highlight is that our measure of violent incidents consists mostly of
misconduct claims that have been sustained by a local agency. To the extent that unionized
agencies are less likely to sustain civilian or internal affairs complaints because of the strong
procedural protections CBAs afford, it is possible that fewer such complaints will be initiated. And
even if the same number of complaints were initiated, the number of sustained complaints reported
to the FDLE would fall. This tendency for fewer complaints to be sustained can also be
characterized as a bias against our finding.
Finally, we noted earlier that the duties of sheriff deputies and police officers are similar
and that the agencies draw upon similar pools of applicants. If the labor market for SO and PD
officers were perfectly integrated and frictionless, then the procedural protections (and other
benefits) of unionized PDs would form part of SO deputies’ outside option. Their ability to
seamlessly switch employers to a unionized PD would have resulted in their receiving these
benefits even prior to Williams, depriving Williams of any impact. In reality, labor markets are not
frictionless; the accumulation of agency-specific human capital and the costs of moving may limit
the mobility of officers across agencies, even if the initial applicant pool is very similar.
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Nonetheless, to the extent that SO and PD labor markets are integrated, that would constitute
another bias against our result.
What mechanisms might explain our results? We have previously suggested that
unionization may provide procedural protections that undermine detection and sanctioning of
misbehaving officers. The most direct path for this mechanism is the SO CBA, which may contain
provisions – beyond those in Florida’s LEOBOR – that make internal disciplinary investigations
more difficult. For example, some Florida CBAs authorize law enforcement officers to challenge
any discipline the local agency seeks to impose through arbitration or other administrative
review,19 preventing the agency from making independent disciplinary decisions. Other rights
include a tightened time limit on internal affairs investigations and expungement of old records,
even when the officer is found to have engaged in misconduct.20 These additional procedural rights
raise the cost of terminating misbehaving officers and thereby lower deterrence. (In ongoing
efforts, we are collecting CBAs from Florida law enforcement agencies with the aim of identifying
specific provisions that provide procedural protections beyond those in Florida’s LEOBOR.)
Second, our results are consistent with the idea that the political influence of unions may lead to
local legislation that embodies similar procedural protections. As an alternative to procedural
protections, and as a third possible mechanism, the processes of successful unionization drives,
collective bargaining meetings, and union officer elections may increase solidarity among officers
and thereby strengthen a code of silence that impedes the detection of misconduct.
Although these unionization mechanisms explain our overall results, they would not
explain the effects we found for SOs without CBAs. The standard explanation here is bargaining
in the shadow of law. The right to unionize gives non-unionized deputies more bargaining power
because sheriffs are more reluctant to alienate deputies who can credibly threaten to unionize. As
19

See, e.g, Agreement Between City of Coral Springs and Fraternal Order of Police I, Law Enforcement Officers,
Lodge #87 (valid through Sept. 30, 2018) (Article 47(c): “After the imposition of discipline, the affected employee
shall have the right to challenge the discipline per Article 37, the Grievance Procedure and Article 38 Arbitration.”);
Agreement Between City of Hialeah. and Dade County Police Benevolent Ass’n (Oct. 1, 2013 – Sept. 30, 2016) (Art.
25, sec. 3(b): “No employee shall serve a suspension without pay until an Arbitrator or the Personnel Board has
rendered a decision, whichever procedure is applicable.”).
20
See, e.g., Agreement Between Fraternal Order of Police, Coral Gables Lodge #7 and The City of Coral Gables (Oct.
1, 2013 – Sept. 30, 2016) (Art. 10(n): “No records will be saved, for any reason, beyond three years from the date that
they were first eligible for destruction with the exception of noticed litigation.”); Agreement Between City of Hialeah,
Fla. and Dade County Police Benevolent Ass’n (Oct. 1, 2013 – Sept. 30, 2016) (Art. 25, sec. 2(o): “Any internal
investigation, except where criminal charges are being investigated, shall be completed within sixty (60) days from
the date the officer is informed of the initial complaint. No officer may be subjected to any disciplinary action as a
result of any investigation not completed within that time period.”).
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one specific possibility, sheriffs before Williams may have disregarded some procedural rights that
deputies possess under Florida’s LEOBOR, yet honored those rights even for non-unionized
deputies once Williams created the unionization threat. Future research should aim to narrow down
the responsible causal mechanisms.

6) Conclusion
This paper provides quasi-experimental evidence on the impact of collective bargaining
rights on law enforcement misconduct, an issue of pressing public importance. Our empirical
strategy exploits the 2003 Florida Supreme Court decision (Williams) that conferred collective
bargaining rights on sheriffs’ deputies, while leaving police departments unaffected. Using a
Florida state administrative database of “moral character” violations reported by local agencies
between 1996 and 2015, we implement a difference-in-difference approach in which police
departments serve as a control group for sheriffs’ offices. Our estimates imply that collective
bargaining rights led to about a 40% increase in violent incidents of misconduct among sheriffs’
offices, corresponding to one incremental incident over a five-year period for the typical sheriff’s
office. This effect is concentrated among sheriffs’ offices that unionized. Together, these results
provide strong evidence for a “shadow effect” from collective bargaining rights and some evidence
of a “CBA effect” among SOs. Although it is difficult, with the variation that exists in our dataset,
to disentangle these two effects, collective bargaining – rather than some extraneous factor – best
explains these findings overall.
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Figure 1: Flowchart of the FDLE Complaint Process

Note: This flowchart depicts a slightly simplified representation of the process by which the
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) handles misconduct complaints. The process
begins at the bottom of the chart, with the receipt of a complaint. FDLE staff first screen out
complaints that do not, on their face, allege a “moral character” violation (MCV). To proceed
further, all complaints must be sustained by the employing agency’s internal affairs (IA) division;
those that were not sustained before reaching the FDLE are sent to the local agency for IA review.
Complaints that both allege an MCV and are sustained in IA are forwarded to an FDLE probable
cause (PC) panel. If PC is found, the complaint proceeds to full commission review. If the
commission finds misconduct by “clear and convincing” evidence, it may discipline the officer.
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Figure 2: CBAs Among Florida Law Enforcement Agencies, 2000-2015

Note: This graph depicts the fraction of Florida law enforcement agencies for which the Criminal
Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) data reports a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) being in
place. This fraction is reported separately for the treatment group of sheriffs’ offices (SOs;
excluding the 9 SOs that obtained collective bargaining rights prior to 2003) and the control group
of police departments (PDs). The vertical red line represents the year of the Williams decision
(2003).
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Figure 3: Violent Incidents, Florida Law Enforcement Agencies, 1996-2015

Note: This graph represents the time pattern of violent incidents in the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (FDLE) Automated Training Management System (ATMS) database, separately for
the treatment group of sheriffs’ offices (SOs; excluding the 9 SOs that obtained collective
bargaining rights prior to 2003) and the control group of police departments (PDs). The graph is
based on the residuals from a Poisson regression of the number of violent incidents on agency
fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the number of law enforcement and concurrently certified
officers associated with each agency-year. These residuals are averaged across SOs and PDs for
each year. The vertical red line represents the year of the Williams decision (2003).
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Figure 4: Trends in Violent Incidents, Florida Law Enforcement Agencies, 1996-2015

Note: This graph represents the trends in the time pattern of violent incidents in the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Automated Training Management System (ATMS)
database, separately for the treatment group of sheriffs’ offices (SOs; excluding the 9 SOs that
obtained collective bargaining rights prior to 2003) and the control group of police departments
(PDs). The graph is based on the residuals from a Poisson regression of the number of violent
incidents on agency fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the number of law enforcement and
concurrently certified officers associated with each agency-year. These residuals are then
regressed on the year (separately for SOs and PDs), using a linear specification for the pre-Williams
period (1996-2002) and a local polynomial approach with a quadratic specification for the postWilliams period (2003-2015). The vertical red line represents the year of the Williams decision
(2003).
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Figure 5: Number of Officers, Florida Law Enforcement Agencies, 1996-2015

Note: This graph depicts the mean number of law enforcement and concurrently certified officers
at Florida law enforcement agencies over 1996-2015. This fraction is reported separately for the
treatment group of sheriffs’ offices (SOs; excluding the 9 SOs that obtained collective bargaining
rights prior to 2003) and the control group of police departments (PDs). The vertical red line
represents the year of the Williams decision (2003).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Sheriffs’ Offices (SOs)
Variable

1996-2002
Number
Mean
Standard
Deviation
160
0
0
406
0.5147783 1.012772
406
0.3866995 .8319072

2003-2015
Number
Mean
Standard
Deviation
721
0.2981969 0.457784
754
0.6220159 1.169144
754
0.4708223 0.9626891

CBA = 1
Violent Incidents
Violent Incidents,
Excluding Potentially
Unverified External
Complaints
Violent Incidents,
406
0.2807882 0.6629343
754
0.4005305 0.8677793
Excluding All
Potentially Unverified
Complaints
Number of Officers
406
210.2685 276.1115
754
266.9509 340.7105
(Law Enforcement
and Concurrent)
Resident Population
406
174.3065 250.9221
754
209.805
295.1946
(thousands)
Fraction of Resident
406
.0601138
.023217
754
0.0666087 0.0267435
Population Aged 1824
Hispanic Fraction of
406
.0739729 .0786061
754
0.1108455 0.1022866
Resident Population
African American
406
.1424147 .1009931
754
0.1441849 0.0952054
Fraction of Resident
Population
Unemployment Rate
406
5.181034 2.096454
754
6.748939 2.759007
(%)
Arrests (thousands)
406
1.74397
2.788198
754
1.790751 2.726963
Note: Panel A reports summary statistics for the 58 SOs in the treatment group, separately for the
pre-Williams period (1996-2002) and the post-Williams period (2003-2015). Florida has 67 SOs
(one per county), but we exclude the 9 SOs that obtained collective bargaining rights through
county-specific legislation prior to 2003. The CBA indicator = 1 if the agency is recorded as having
a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in the CJAP dataset. “Violent Incidents” is the number
of incidents (involving law enforcement and concurrent officers) reported in the ATMS database
that we classify as “violent” using the categories in the Appendix. The number of officers
(restricted to those with law enforcement or concurrent certification) is from the ATMS database.
The resident population, the fraction of the resident population aged 18-24, and the Hispanic and
African American fractions of the resident population are from Census Bureau estimates, and are
at the county-year level. The unemployment rate is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and is at
the county-year level. Arrests are from the UCR dataset and are at the agency-year level (i.e.,
pertain to the area under the jurisdiction of a given agency).
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Panel B: Police Departments (PDs)
Variable

1996-2002
2003-2015
Number
Mean
Standard Number
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Deviation
697
0.5638451 0.4962632 3,112 0.5851542 0.4927746
1,806 0.2414175 0.736369
3,354 0.1979726 0.6189536
1,806
0.1749723 0.5759293 3,354 0.1550388 0.5432062

CBA = 1
Violent Incidents
Violent Incidents,
Excluding Potentially
Unverified External
Complaints
Violent Incidents,
1,806
0.1306755 0.4921323 3,354 0.1258199 0.4807366
Excluding All
Potentially Unverified
Complaints
Number of Officers
1,806
59.0454
116.4807
3,354
65.22004 121.8168
(Law Enforcement
and Concurrent)
Resident Population
1,806
673.8522 713.3858
3,354
768.0201 792.6498
(thousands)
Fraction of Resident
1,806
0.0574986 0.0199476 3,354 0.0638977 0.0227344
Population Aged 1824
Hispanic Fraction of
1,806
0.1397922 0.1659797 3,354 0.1866478 0.1789958
Resident Population
African American
1,806
0.1510611 0.0930864 3,354 0.1566774 0.089946
Fraction of Resident
Population
Unemployment Rate
1,806
4.888213 1.593196
3,354
6.709763 2.715023
(%)
Arrests (thousands)
1,780
0.4468635 1.11458
3,353 0.4773337 0.9763213
Note: Panel B reports summary statistics for the control group (PDs), separately for the preWilliams period (1996-2002) and the post-Williams period (2003-2015). There are up to 258 PDs
with the required data (although the number is smaller for some variables). The variables are
defined as described in the notes to Panel A.
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Table 2: The Impact of Collective Bargaining Rights on Violent Incidents
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent Variable: Violent Incidents
Post-Williams*SO
Number of Officers

0.33594***
(0.129)
0.00044
(0.000)

0.33869***
(0.125)
0.00060
(0.001)
-0.00021
(0.001)
7.97497
(8.592)
3.26136
(2.534)
-7.47212*
(4.041)
-0.04922
(0.037)
0.00071
(0.016)

0.50854**
(0.204)
0.00024
(0.002)
-0.00184
(0.002)
-0.52452
(9.606)
7.63641
(9.155)
-15.48351
(10.905)
-0.14580
(0.121)
0.02754
(0.084)

Yes
1996-2015

Yes
1996-2015

Yes
1999-2006

Resident Population
Fraction of Resident Population
Aged 18-24
Hispanic Fraction of Resident
Population
African American Fraction of
Resident Population
Unemployment Rate (%)
Arrests
Agency and Year Fixed Effects?
Sample Period

0.32888**
(0.153)
0.00047
(0.001)
0.00001
(0.001)
-1.88661
(10.940)
2.87675
(2.658)
-6.05630
(4.296)
-0.03843
(0.041)
-0.00416
(0.017)

Yes
1996-2002,
2009-2015
Observations
4,760
4,740
1,408
2,959
Number of Agencies
238
238
176
212
Note: This table reports regression results for the number of violent incidents at the agency-year
level. The primary variable of interest is the interaction between a post-Williams indicator (for
years beginning in 2003) and an indicator for sheriffs’ offices (SOs). All other variables are as
defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors clustered at the agency level are in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements
(1)
Treatment
Group: SOs
with a CBA
by 2015

(2)
Treatment
Group: SOs
without a
CBA by 2015

(3)
All
Agencies

(4)
All
Agencies

Dependent Variable: Violent Incidents
Post-Williams*SO

0.37135**
(0.150)

0.32252*
(0.185)

Post-Williams*SO*CBA

0.38159**
(0.179)
0.18533
(0.151)

SO*CBA
Number of Officers
Resident Population
Fraction of Resident Population
Aged 18-24
Hispanic Fraction of Resident
Population
African American Fraction of
Resident Population
Unemployment Rate (%)
Arrests

0.00078
(0.001)
-0.00051
(0.001)
3.70472
(9.010)
4.36952
(3.539)
-8.42355*
(4.299)
-0.04728
(0.042)
-0.00151
(0.017)

-0.00076
(0.001)
-0.00031
(0.001)
15.12869**
(7.161)
5.69048**
(2.888)
-8.89584**
(4.275)
-0.05566
(0.044)
-0.01813
(0.020)

0.00050
(0.001)
-0.00021
(0.001)
9.40647
(8.685)
8.55421**
(4.162)
-12.65003**
(5.250)
-0.12740**
(0.059)
0.00345
(0.022)

0.31124**
(0.152)
0.00109
(0.001)
-0.00047
(0.001)
9.54942
(8.907)
8.33416**
(4.004)
-13.65734***
(5.242)
-0.12607**
(0.059)
-0.00604
(0.019)

Agency and Year Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects?
Sample Period
1996-2015
1996-2015
2000-2015
2000-2015
Observations
4,180
4,240
3,285
3,285
Number of Agencies
210
213
213
213
Note: This table reports regression results for the number of violent incidents at the agency-year
level. The primary variable of interest in Columns 1-3 is the interaction between a post-Williams
indicator (for years beginning in 2003) and an indicator for sheriffs’ offices (SOs). In Column 3,
an interaction term between this variable and an indicator for CBA=1 is also introduced. In Column
4, the variable of interest is an interaction between an indicator for sheriffs’ offices (SOs) and an
indicator for CBA=1. All other variables are as defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors clustered
at the agency level are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Robustness Checks and Extensions

Post-Williams*SO
Number of Officers
Resident Population
Fraction of Resident Population
Aged 18-24
Hispanic Fraction of Resident
Population
African American Fraction of
Resident Population
Unemployment Rate (%)
Arrests
Agency and Year Fixed Effects?
Sample Period

(1)
Dependent
Variable:
Violent
Incidents,
Excluding
Potentially
Unverified
External
Complaints

(2)
Dependent
Variable:
Violent
Incidents,
Excluding
All
Potentially
Unverified
Complaints

(3)
Dependent
Variable:
Violent
Incidents,
Excluding
2006

(4)
Dependent
Variable:
Violent
Incident
Rate

0.34694**
(0.141)
-0.00005
(0.001)
0.00002
(0.001)
7.07081
(6.741)
2.55205
(2.910)
-5.20808
(4.315)
-0.03164
(0.042)
0.00824
(0.020)

0.36398**
(0.156)
0.00037
(0.001)
-0.00026
(0.001)
12.01542
(8.239)
2.97863
(2.671)
-6.00711
(4.688)
-0.04711
(0.047)
0.01853
(0.022)

0.26839**
(0.130)
0.00083
(0.001)
-0.00013
(0.001)
7.95029
(9.569)
2.75790
(2.576)
-7.10613*
(3.997)
-0.04400
(0.037)
0.00238
(0.017)

0.26392**
(0.121)

Yes
1996-2015

Yes
1996-2015

0.00004
(0.001)
8.29990
(8.700)
1.92628
(2.342)
-7.23551*
(3.800)
-0.05625
(0.037)
0.00149
(0.016)

Yes
Yes
1996-2005
1996-2015
2007-2015
Observations
4,264
4,072
4,483
4,681
Number of Agencies
214
204
237
238
Note: This table reports regression results for the number of violent incidents (defined in several
alternative ways) at the agency-year level. The primary variable of interest is the interaction
between a post-Williams indicator (for years beginning in 2003) and an indicator for sheriffs’
offices (SOs). In Column 4, the number of officers is used as the exposure variable: i.e. the natural
logarithm of the number of officers is included in the regression and its coefficient is constrained
to be 1. This implies that the specification in Column 4 models the violent incident rate rather than
the number of violent incidents. All other variables are as defined in Table 1. Robust standard
errors clustered at the agency level are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix: Types of Offenses Committed by Law Enforcement or Concurrent Officers in the
FDLE ATMS Database That Are Included in “Violent Incidents”

Number of
Incidents
(Baseline
Measure)
Offense Type
Aggrav Asslt Pol Off
Aggravated Assault
Aggravated Stalking
Arson
Assault
Battery
Battery - Domestic Violence
Battery-Domestic Violence-Strang.
Child Abuse
Cruelty to Animals
Cruelty Toward Child
Culpable Negligence
Cyberstalking
Disorderly Conduct
Excess Force by Corr
Excess Force by LEO
False Imprisonment
Harassing Communica.
Hit And Run
Homicide
Improper Exhibition of Dangerous Weapon
Indecent Exposure
Intimidation
Kidnapping
Lewd & Lascivious Exhibition
Lewd & Lascivious Molestation
Loitering and Prowling
Manslaughter
Manslaughter-Vehicle
Neglect Child
Neglect Family
Peeping Tom
Public Order
Riot-Engaging In
Robbery

10
92
1
15
403
9
428
1
6
2
34
27
1
11
36
410
1
5
10
13
4
31
5
58
1
4
5
4
6
10
1
3
1
2
20

Number of
Incidents

Number of
Incidents

Excluding
Potentially
Unverified
External
Complaints

Excluding All
Unverified
External
Complaints

8
65
1
11
304
7
300
0
6
2
25
20
1
11
35
267
1
4
9
12
4
30
4
42
1
4
3
1
4
8
0
1
1
2
17

7
51
1
9
256
5
246
0
6
1
21
16
0
10
24
181
1
4
7
11
4
22
3
39
0
2
2
1
3
8
0
1
1
2
15
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Sex Assault
Sex Asslt-Carnal Abu
Sex Off Agst.Child
Sex Offense
Sexual Battery
Simple Assault
Stalking
Stat Rape-No Force
Unlawful Sexual Activity with a Minor
Video Voyeurism
Viol Repeat Violence Injunct
Violation for Injunct. for Protect. Against Domestic
Violence

104
4
93
125
3
46
80
2
1
1
28

84
3
88
111
3
39
64
2
1
1
26

66
2
79
91
1
33
53
1
1
1
23

1

1

1
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